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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (9 May 68) FOR OT RD 681288

13 May 1968

AD390249

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Cavalry Division (AM), Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)**

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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as


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco, California 96490

AVDAG

17 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

THRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Summary of Personnel Activities: Morale remained high during November and December as the Division continued operations on the Bong Son Plain. Administrative support elements remained based at An Khe and experienced no new problems in providing personnel services for the forward elements. In mid January the Division Headquarters and 1st Brigade moved from the Pershing AO to the Hue Phu Bai-Quang Tri area and were joined there by the 3rd Brigade. The shift of the division away from An Khe taxed the administrative support agencies and brought about a realignment of responsibilities. The most significant of these was the planning for consolidation of all rear area activities under the Adjutant General. Replacements are to be received, equipped, trained and moved forward to their units under AG control. By the end of the month most important personnel services had been reestablished, in the Jeb Stuart AO.

2. Intelligence:

a. Weather and Terrain (Det 31, 5th Weather Squadron)

(1) November 1967. The northeast monsoon, although a dominating influence on the weather pattern during November, was relatively mild having only three identifiable surges, and these were of light to moderate intensity. The duration of the surges was two to four days. One typhoon (Typhoon Freda) developed rapidly west of the Philippine Islands and moved at 12 knots westward making its landfall on 9 November at Tuy Hoa. The remainder of the month was characterized by mild weather.

(2) December 1967. The northeast monsoon continued to dominate both the Pershing AO and the An Khe areas during the month of December. The monsoon was light to moderate in intensity with only two surges (remnants of cold fronts) moving thru the area. The surges occurred from the 1st thru the 3d and again from the 11th thru the 12th of the month. Other passages were suspected; however, 60% of the total precipitation for the month at both An Khe and LZ Two Bits occurred during the five day period that the surges were in the area. Maximum wind speeds and gusts also occurred during the surge period.

(3) 1-18 January 1968

(a) The weather in the Pershing AO was generally good. The major problem encountered was low clouds that tended to form during the night over the higher ridges causing partly obscured tops until 1000 to 1200H. Ceilings on the Bong Son Plain were generally 2,000 feet or higher. Visibility on the plains was good with few restrictions below three miles. Dense morning fog occurred in the interior valleys about once every three days.

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(b) The northeast monsoon continued to be quite weak during operations in the Jeb Stuart AO. The major problem encountered was fog and ground fog. The formation of ground fog was an almost daily occurrence. The ground fog formed between 0300 and 0400L and dissipated between 0800 and 0900L. Denser fog formed in the interior and coastal valleys, dissipating between 0945 and 1030L. On three occasions denser fog formed over the lowlands causing 1/8 to 1/4 mile visibilities and to improve very slowly. The fog lifted into a stratus deck and visibilities improved two to three miles by 1030L, while continued improvement produced clear to scattered sky conditions and six mile visibility by 1200L.

b. Enemy Activities:

(1) Operation Pershing (1 November 1967 - 18 January 1968)

(a) November 1967. During the month of November the regiments of the 3d NVA Division remained relatively stationary, making minor moves to avoid contact with the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The 2d VC Regimental Headquarters remained in the Cay Giap Mountains; the 93d Battalion moved south into the Nui Micu Mountains; the 8th Battalion operated in the mountains northwest of the An Leo Valley; and the 9th Battalion remained scattered on the Bong Son Plain. The 18th NVA Regimental Headquarters and the 9th Battalion remained in the CRID AO (Phu Cat Mountains area) and were joined by the 8th Battalion during November. The 7th Battalion, 18th NVA Regiment remained in the mountains west of LZ Crystal. Contact with the enemy during November was light; however, the enemy did increase his harassment program.

(b) December 1967. During December the regiments of the 3d NVA Division moved generally southward. During early December the 22d Regimental Headquarters and support elements, as well as the 7th and 8th Battalions, moved from the Binh Dinh-Quang Ngai border onto the northern Bong Son Plain. In a reversal of tactics of avoiding decisive contact with US and ARVN forces at LZ Tom on 6 December, marking the start of the Battle of Tam Quan. The Battle of Tam Quan continued until 17 December and resulted in a major defeat for the 22d NVA Regiment. Enemy elements identified in the action included the 22d NVA Regimental Headquarters, 132d Signal Company, and the 7th and 8th Battalions. During late December the 22d NVA Regimental Headquarters moved to the northern Cay Giap Mountains; the 7th Battalion moved to the foothills of the northeastern Cay Giap; while the 8th Battalion possibly moved into the central portion of the Cay Giap. The 9th Battalion remained unlocated; however, the 92d Company and possibly the 93d Company of the 9th Battalion were reported in the Vinh Thanh area in late December.

In early December the 2d VC Regiment moved from the Cay Giap Mountains into the Nui Micu Mountains, joining the 93d and 95th Battalions which had moved from the western crescent area. The 97th Battalion moved south from southern Quang Ngai (P) and joined the rest of the 2d VC Regiment in the Nui Micu Mountains in mid to late December. Possible elements of 93d and 95th Battalion engaged friendly units east of the Nui Micu Mountains on 17 & 18 December in the only moderate contacts with the 2d VC Regiment during the month.

The 18th NVA Regimental Headquarters and the 8th and 9th Battalions remained in CRID AO (Phu Cat Mountains); while the 7th Battalion, 18th Regiment, remained in the mountains west of LZ Crystal and avoided major contact.

(c) 1-18 January 1968. During the period 1-18 January the battalions of the 22d NVA Regiment continued to avoid contact with the 1st ACD in the Pershing AO. The 22d NVA Regimental Headquarters and the 7th and 8th Battalions remained in the Cay Giap Mountains. The 9th Battalion, 22d NVA Regiment was believed to be located east of the An Leo Valley in the foothills in the vicinity of BS 8010.

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The 2d VC Regiment continued to operate in the Nui Mieu Mountains. The 93rd Battalion and elements of an unidentified Sapper unit attacked LZ Moon during the early morning hours of 10 January. The 2d Battalion, 41st ARVN Regiment repulsed the attackers and killed 41 NVA. The 97th Battalion was engaged on 2-3 January in the Battle of the Dam Tra O Lake and suffered 97 KIA. Five crew served weapons were captured along with two NVA soldiers. The 95th Battalion continued to operate in the southern Nui Mieu Mountains and suffered 30 KIA, including the Battalion Executive Officer, on 10 January in contact with C 1/9 Cav and as a result of USAF air strikes.

The 7th Battalion, 18th NVA Regiment moved from the mountains west of LZ Crystal and joined the remainder of the 18th NVA Regiment in the Phu Cat Mountains in the CRID AO.

Effective 190001 January 1968 the 1st Air Cavalry Division turned operation Pershing over to the 2nd Bde, under the operational control of IFFORCEV, and deployed to the Jeb Stuart AO. Enemy losses during Operation Pershing (11 Feb 67 - 182400 Jan 68) were:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
<u>NVA/VC</u>	<u>NVA/VC</u>	<u>INDIV/CS</u>
2,029/3,367	236/2,123	1,329/137

(2) Operation Jeb Stuart (19-31 Jan 68)

The 1st Air Cavalry Division (-) with the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division attached, commenced Operation Jeb Stuart on 220001 Jan 68 against elements of the 812th NVA Regiment, 9th NVA Regiment, and 7th NVA Regiment in Base Area 101 and against elements of the 6th NVA Regiment in Base Area 114 in northern I CTZ. The 1st ARVN Division conducted operations in the Quang Tri City area and defended the city from the enemy elements around and within the city. Operation Jeb Stuart continues. Enemy losses for the period in Operation Jeb Stuart are as follows:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
<u>NVA/VC</u>	<u>NVA/VC</u>	<u>INDIV/CS</u>
269/54		51/12

c. Intelligence Operations

(1) G2 Aerial Surveillance

(a) Mission statistics for the period 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68

<u>MISSION TYPE</u>	<u>ASTA</u>	<u>COMPLETED BY</u> <u>IFFORCEV</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
IR	210	12	999 Hot Spots
SLAR	148	0	532 MTI
Photo	77*	24**	
Photo (Hand Held)	41	0	
Reprint	19***	9	

* - 15 Missions pending

** - 2 Missions pending

*** - 2 Missions pending

(b) General Comments: Aerial surveillance operations were hampered throughout the reporting period by the effects of the northeast monsoon.

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1. IR. The ASTA Platoon exchanged the three original OV-10 aircraft deployed to RVN with the 1st Cavalry Division. During the reporting period the ASTA Platoon completed 185 of 310 missions with the remainder cancelled due to weather and/or sensor or aircraft malfunction. IFFORCEV support was provided by the 225 Aerial Surveillance Company during operations in the Pershing AO. IR requirements in the Job Stuart AO cover 1,320 square kilometers compared to 300 square kilometers in the Pershing AO.

2. SLAR. The ASTA Platoon continued to support the Market Time operation in conjunction with the US Navy and the Lightning Bug operation at the 225th Assault Helicopter Battalion during operation Pershing.

3. Photo. The Hand-Held Camera Program was officially adopted by the Division and became operational in December. Numerous requests for area coverage missions were received upon arrival in the Job Stuart AO.

(2) 54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar)

During the period 1 November 1967 - 17 January 1968 the 54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar) provided radar support for the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Pershing AO and the TAOR. Effective 17 January 1968 the 54th Infantry Detachment was detached from the 1st Air Cavalry Division and attached to the 173rd Abn Bde. Organic radar distribution is two FTS-4's at LZ English. IFFORCEV directed that the Detachment assets be left on position in the Pershing AO. Two FTS-4's are presently located at Camp Evans and steps are presently being taken to organize a Division Ground Surveillance Radar Detachment with radar equipment that is organic to each Brigade but without personnel allocations.

(3) Co E, 52d Infantry (Long Range Patrol)

During the reporting period the 1st ACD's LRRP Detachment became Co E, 52d Infantry (LRRP) as the MFOE was approved by DA. The company conducted 105 patrols during the period, operating from bases at Phan Thiet, LZ Uplift and LZ English. Training was conducted in the Camp Redcliff TAOR area for both US and indigenous personnel. 350 sightings of enemy personnel were made by the LRRP Company during the reporting period. During January the LRRP Company moved seven teams to the Job Stuart AO and left six teams in the Pershing AO with the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division. One operation was conducted in the Job Stuart AO. Complete LRRP statistics for Operation Pershing will be included in the G2 After Action Report.

3. Operations and Training

a. Organization: See inclosure 6.

b. Operations

(1) General: During the period 1 November 1967 to 21 January 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division continued to conduct operations in Binh Dinh Province, furnished a Battalion Task Force to 101st Abn Div (Operation Klamath Falls), a Brigade Task Force to the Americal Division (Operation Wheeler/Wallowa), and a Battalion Task Force to the 4th Infantry Division (Operation MacArthur). During the period 21 January 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted operations in the ARVN 1st Corps Tactical Zone (Operation Job Stuart).

(2) 1st Brigade

(a) During the period 1 November 1967 to 21 January 1968, the brigade conducted intensive operations throughout the Bong Son Plain, the An Lao Valley, the coastal highlands overlooking the Bong Son Plain east of the An Lao Valley. The operations were characterized by a

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variety of techniques employed to destroy the NVA/VC infrastructure while constantly keeping the enemy forces off balance. Cordon search and "Swooper" Operations were emphasized in the hamlets located within the AO in conjunction with the NFFP. These operations took advantage of all available intelligence to destroy the VC infrastructure and exercise population control in the AO. Psychological Warfare Teams and Civil Affairs Teams were habitually used to support these operations. During daylight hours, search/destroy and search/clear operations were conducted throughout the AO to search out the hiding places of the enemy, and when found to capture or destroy him. Brigade forces were alert and reacted constantly to intelligence indicating suspected enemy locations anywhere in the AO. "Selective Snatch" operations were employed during daylight hours to deny the enemy a sanctuary among the local population. During the hours of darkness, the brigade employed "Hunter Killer" teams and used "Bushmaster Operations" to deny the enemy freedom of movement at night. Brigade forces were repositioned to provide for additional security of critical installations during the Christmas truce period. There were no unusual incidents during the ceasefire.

(b) During the period 21 January 1968 to 31 January, the brigade conducted a tactical move to Quang Tri Province in the ARVN 1st Corps Tactical Zone. The priority of effort was directed toward establishing suitable fire bases to support future offensive operations in Base Area 101.

(3) 2d Brigade 101st Abn: Arriving in the Job Stuart AO on 24 January, the 2d Brigade 101st Abn spent the remaining seven days in January conducting combat patrols in the 1 ACD tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) around Gia Lo. When the Division CP moved to Camp Evans on 27 January, the 2d Brigade 101st Abn assumed responsibility for all combat operations in the TAOR.

(4) 2d Brigade 1 ACD: During the period 1 November 1967 to 21 January 1968, the 2d Brigade continued to find, engage and destroy enemy forces in the Pershing AO. Operations, which were conducted in the Crescent, Nui Mieu, Cay Giop, and 506 Valley, continued to be primarily company and smaller size search and clear, or cordon and search operations. The brigade also continued to provide security for the Bong Son Bridges, LZ's Uplift, Ollie, and Pony. The 2d Brigade assisted in support of Hoi An and Phu My Districts and conducted operations in conjunction with the 41st ARVN Regt. and Marine TF-4.

(5) 3d Brigade: During the period 25 January 1968 to 31 January 1968, the 3d Brigade conducted combat patrols in both the TAOR at Gia Lo and the Job Stuart AO at Camp Evans.

(6) 1/9 Cavalry:

(a) During the period 1 November 1967 to 21 January 1968, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry continued Operation Pershing with no change in mission or unit location. B Troop remained attached to the 3d Brigade for Operation Wheeler in Quang Tin Province, while other detachments continued to support TF 2/7 Cav in the Klamath Falls AO and Operation Dazzler in the TAOR. The Squadron (-) provided surveillance of the Pershing AO and reconnaissance to the 1st and 2d Brigades on a mission basis. The Squadron also continued to direct security operations for the LZ Two Bits complex. Only once during the reporting period, did LZ Two Bits receive indirect fire. Reconnaissance effort was concentrated on the Bong Son Plain, Cay Giop Mountains, Nui Mieu Mountains, and Soul Ca Valley to locate elements of the 3d NVA Division and main force VC units. These operations met with singular success when on 6 December, "A" Troop located major elements of the 22d NVA Regiment on the Bong Son Plain (see incl 12).

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(b) During the period 21 January thru 31 January 1968, the Squadron (-) moved with the 1 ACD to the Job Stuart AO. "A" Troop remained in the Pershing AO providing reconnaissance and support to the 2d Brigade. In the Job Stuart AO, the Squadron (-) provided support to the Brigades on a mission basis and reconnaissance of the new Division AO. Initial priority of reconnaissance was directed toward base areas 101 and 114.

(7) Combat Support Elements

(a) Division Artillery

1 During the period 1 November 1967 to 21 January 1968, Division Artillery continued its fire support mission in the Dazzlem and Pershing AO's. 2d Bn, 20th Artillery (ABA) (-) continued in a general support role with Btry A (-) continued in a general support role with Btry A (-) and Btry B (-) in the Pershing AO and one platoon in support of the Dazzlem AO. Btry E, 82d Arty (Atm) continued support of Division Artillery in the Pershing and Dazzlem AO's. 1st Bn, 19th Arty continued in a DS role to the 1st Bde. The 1st Bn, 77th Arty (-), with Btry C, 2d Bn, 17th Arty attached and Btry E, 7th Bn, 13th Arty reinforcing, continued support of the 2d Bde. The most significant action of the reporting period was a contact initiated on 6 December 1967 in the 1st Bde AO.

2 During the period 21 January thru 31 January 1968, Division Artillery supported the 1st ACD in the Job Stuart AO.

(b) 11th Aviation Group

1 During the period 1 November 1967 to 20 January 1968, Headquarters, 11th Avn Gp supported operations from LZ Two Bits. The 227th AHB (-) supported 3d Brigade from its location at Chu Lai; B Co (-) supported Pershing from LZ Dog with six lift ships at Kontum during Operation MacArthur and A Co continued support of Operation Byrd at Phan Thiet with additional lift support to 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division during Operation Klamath Falls. The 228th AHB (-) supported Pershing from its forward lagering base at LZ English. A Co (-) provided support for Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. Byrd and Dazzlem were supported with three CH-47 aircraft each throughout the period. The 229th AHB (-) supported 1st and 2d Bde's in the Pershing AO from LZ English. B Co provided base defense at An Khe and supported the 4th Inf Div at Kontum during Operation MacArthur.

2 On 21 January 1968, the 11th Avn Gp (-) moved from the Pershing and Dazzlem AO's to Hue Phu Bai. When the 1 ACD OP moved to Camp Evans, the 11th Avn Gp (-) followed. Camp Evans became the 1 ACD primary helicopter larger base for helicopters in the Job Stuart AO.

(c) 8th Engineer Bn: Continued to support the 1 ACD in the Pershing and Dazzlem AO's until 19 January 1968. On 19 January 1968 the 8th Engineer Bn (-) arrived in the Job Stuart AO and provided engineer support to the 1 ACD in the new AO.

(d) 15th Signal Bn

1 During the period 1 November 1967 to 19 January 1968, the 15th Signal Bn continued to provide the 1 ACD and its supporting units with communications support for Operations Pershing, Dazzlem, Klamath Falls, Wheeler/Wallowa, and MacArthur. Lateral communications support was provided to the 22d ARVN Division, Capitol ROK Inf Div, and 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. The battalion also completed the base development of the communications site on Hong Kong Mountain, culminated by the dedication of Hong Kong by MG Tolson to the men of the Signal Corps who were killed in its defense.

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2 On 19 January 1968, the 13th Signal Battalion (-) departed the Dazzle AO and initiated operations in the Job Stuart AO. For the remainder of the reporting period the Bn (-) supported the 1 ACD in the Job Stuart AO.

c. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations

(1) Operation Pershing (11 Feb 67 - 21 Jan 68)

(a) Attached and supporting units of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (-) continued throughout the reporting period to conduct Operation Pershing in northeastern Binh Dinh Province. The period saw a marked increase in enemy activity and consequently the Division was engaged in heavy contact on numerous occasions. The Battle of Tan Quan (see incl 12) lasted for 11 days (6-17 Dec) and was the most significant contact to date in this operation, resulting in 647 enemy KIA, 6 captured and 99 weapons captured or destroyed. There can be little doubt that the 7th and 8th Bns of the 22d NVA Regt were thoroughly routed from the field of battle and virtually decimated. However, the Bong Son Plain was only one of a number of areas that saw a sudden resurgence of action during the report period. It is obvious that the 3d NVA embarked on a new course of action for reasons unknown at this time. The tactics of airmobility and aerial reconnaissance which have been practiced for so long paid off handsomely as the enemy found himself confronted by massive firepower and superior strength everytime he tried to concentrate his own force.

(b) Significant actions occurring in Operation Pershing during the reporting period were:

1 On 24 November 1967, A Co 2/5 Cav observed and engaged a 10 man enemy force north of the mountains (vic BR 922984). C Trp 1/9 Cav supported the contact with gunship fires. Results of the engagement were 9 NVA KIA, 1 NVAC and 9 SIGS's captured.

2 A contact from a IRRP sighting occurred in the Suoi a Valley on 4-5 December. The XO of the E2B Main Force VC Battalion and 21 other VC were killed and 2 captured by C 1/9 Cav. The element was a recon party and propaganda cadre from the Binh Dinh Province Headquarters on a supply mission to the E2B Battalion. Three each PRG-25's and 2 weapons were captured.

3 The Battle of Tan Quan was fought on the Bong Son Plains during the period of 6-17 December against elements of the 22d NVA Regimental Headquarters and its 7th and 8th Battalions. This highly significant contact resulted in almost 650 enemy killed and should have an impressive effect on the local population in that area. (See incl 12)

4 On 14 Dec, the 93d Bn, 2d VC Regt attacked Trung Xuan Hamlet (CR 002672) and overran a RF outpost in an effort to draw Allied Forces into an ambush. However the 41st ARVN Regt reinforced by a RF Company and C 1/50th Mech disrupted their plan by forcing the 93d Battalion into contact before allied units reached the kill zone on the ambush site. In a sharp two day contact the enemy was pounded by artillery and TAC Air almost without letup. Total results of the action were 115 NVA KIA, 16 weapons and 5 NVA captured by allied units.

5 A contact with 2d VC Regimental Headquarters elements on the beach east of the Nui Mieu Mountains (vic CR 051737) from 17-20 December resulted in a total of 21 enemy KIA and 6 weapons and several inches of important documents captured. Some of the documents indicated that one of the KIA was possibly the 2d Regt CO or Deputy CO.

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6 On the 19-20 Dec, C 1/9 Cav responded to a LRRP sighting in the Soui Ca Valley (vic BR 842561). In two days of combined air and ground action, C 1/9 Cav killed 16 enemy from the 123d Air Defense Co of the 18th Regt including a platoon leader. Some 12.7mm ammo and RPG parts were captured.

7 On 22 Dec, elements of 1/9 Cav responded to an intelligence report of a CP located in the south Mui Mieu Mtns (vic BR 996687). Contact was made with elements of the 93d Bn, 2d Regt and artillery, TAC air strikes, and Naval gunfire were called in on the enemy positions and routes of egress. Air strikes and 1/9 Cav elements accounted for 39 NVA KIA on this day and elements of 2/5 Cav and 1/50th Mech, moved into the area to block routes of escape. The following day two companies of the 41st ARVN Regt conducted search operations in the area and made sporadic contact resulting in 15 NVA KIA and 5 NVA POW's. Total results for this operation were 57 NVA KIA, 9 NVA POW and 15 weapons captured.

8 On 29 December, a CIDG Company, reinforced with two PF platoons conducted search operations in Happy Valley (vic BR 625556) and at 0930H made contact with the 92d Co, 9th Bn, 22d NVA Regt. One additional CIDG company reinforced from the Vinh Thanh Camp and gunships from 1/9 Cav were sent to the scene. As the contact continued to develop two companies from 2/5 Cav and two companies from 1/5 Cav were air assaulted into the area to provide additional support and to restrict enemy movement. Additional artillery was quickly air lifted to the Vinh Thanh Camp to provide increased firepower support. Fighting continued through the next day. Total enemy losses were 52 NVA KIA (32 by US and 20 by CIDG/PF), 2 NVAC, and 17 weapons captured.

9 During the period 20-24 December, Operation Frostbite was conducted by Qui Nhon Support Command. 1st Air Cav forces in Operation Foxhunting played a vital and important part in Operation Frostbite which involved the movement of the entire 11th Light Infantry Brigade from Qui Nhon to Duc Pho via Highway 1. The enemy was aware of the arrival of the 11th LIB in Qui Nhon and announced over the radio that these forces would never reach Duc Pho by highway. In a highly coordinated operation 1 ACD provided highway security and reaction forces tied together in a responsive package. Operations along the highway area were increased to detect and deter any enemy attempt at ambush. The success of this operation may be judged by the fact that not a single enemy initiated incident hampered the movement of the Brigade with all its organic equipment and personnel.

10 On 2 January 1968, in the vicinity of coordinates (TR 806690), elements of the 1/9 Cav observed numerous enemy with packs and weapons. An infantry platoon was inserted and engaged the enemy as gunships provided aerial gunfire support. Results of the contact were 20 NVA KIA.

11 During the period 2-4 January 1968, east of the Dam Tra O elements of the 1/50 Mech came under heavy fire while attempting to cordon the hamlet of An Loc (vic BR 995825). The size of the enemy force was estimated to be a battalion. Additional units of the 1/50 Mech, 1/5 Cav, and 2/5 Cav moved to the area of contact. ARA and TAC air strikes were called in on the enemy positions. Enemy automatic weapons fire and rocket fire halted US attempts to attack the enemy positions. By 4 January enemy resistance in the area diminished, and elements of the 1/50 Mech and 1/5 Cav were able to sweep the area. Total enemy losses in the area of contact were 97 NVA KIA, 2 NVAC, 23 SA's and 5 crew served weapons.

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12 On 11 January 1968, in the south Mai Mieu Mtns (vic BR 986678) elements of 1/9 Cav spotted a group of NVA with web gear and weapons. The 1/9 Cav initiated contact with the enemy. As the contact developed, one company 2/5 Cav was air assaulted into the area of contact. Another company from 1/50 Mech moved overland toward the area of contact. Results of the battle were 29 NVA KIA and 1 NVAC.

13 On 14 January 1968, ARVN elements conducting operations on the east Dong Son Plain made contact with an estimated enemy battalion (-) (vic BS 907082). The contact lasted throughout the afternoon with the enemy forces using automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire. Their engagement resulted in 30 NVA KIA, 11 small arms captured and one LMG captured.

(c) Total enemy losses for Operation Pershing are:

KIA NVA/VC	2023/3365
POW NVA/VC	236/2120
Returns	221
CD's Captured	1974
Detainees	10,609
Wpns captured SA/CS	1330/137
Rice-Salt seized	440.8/42.65

(2) Operation Dazzle continued throughout the reporting period without any change in missions. The Base Defense Task Force was strengthened by the addition of an Armored Cav Platoon and a Tank Platoon. These forces (1/A/1/69 Arm and 1/B/2/1 AC) were received OPCON from the 4th Inf Div on 15 Dec 57 and are being employed for highway security along Highway 19 within the TAOR. On 3 December OPLAN M urader, a detailed ground sweep of the area around Camp Redcliff, was executed due to intelligence indications of an impending attack. There were negative significant results. On 6 November 1967, the 1/12 Cav relieved the 2/5 Cav and assumed the responsibility for the Base Defense mission. On 9 November the 1/12 Cav was relieved by the 1/5 Cav. On 28 December the 1/12 Cav relieved the 1/5 Cav. At 1200 hrs on 17 January 1968 the 1 LCD was relieved of the mission of base defense at Camp Redcliff. The 173d Abn Bde (SRP) assumed the mission and assigned the 3/503 Abn the mission of Base Defense.

(b) Significant actions occurring in Operation Dazzle during the reporting period were:

1 Enemy attack on 02 December on 60 man PF outpost (vic BR 550516) by an estimated company size enemy force. Under cover of heavy fog and darkness, enemy forces launched a ground attack against OP Henry and succeeded in breaching the perimeter and occupying the OP for a short period of time. The defenders fought well until the enemy entered the position and they became outnumbered and lost the advantage of prepared positions. The enemy paid for his success by leaving 11 KIA's hanging on the perimeter wire and by failing to annihilate the PF force which suffered only moderate casualties.

2 Enemy attack of a 68 vehicle convoy on Highway 19 on 04 December. At 0815H an estimated 3 NVA platoons ambushed a large convoy vic BR 34459. The convoy had its own security forces which responded in a commendable manner. In addition artillery, ARA and GO-GO responded and were in the contact area within minutes. One company from 1/5 Cav was on the ground in the area within 15 minutes. In all, 17 NVA were killed and five enemy weapons captured. One US was killed and 4 wounded.

3 On 4 January 1968, the enemy launched a mortar attack against Camp Redcliff. ARA and flakships responded immediately and artillery initiated counter mortar fire. Approximately 83 mortar rounds were fired by the enemy resulting in 7 aircraft damaged. Early morning searches resulted with negative enemy contact.

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(c) Total enemy losses from Operation Dazzle:

KIA NVA/VC	39/41
POW NVA/VC	1/8
Returns NVA/VC	0/1
CD's captured	5
Detainees	394
Wpns Captured SA/CS	34/8
Rice/Salt seized	1.25/.14

(3) Operation Job Stuart (21 January 1968 - continuing)

(a) Task Organization

1 1st Brigade

Maneuver Battalions

2/19 Arty (DS)
A Btry (105)
B Btry (105)
B Btry 1/77 (105)
C Btry 1/77 (105)
A Co, 8th Engr (DS)
Plt, 545th MP Co
2 Sqds, 25th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
Det Pathfinders
4 LRRP Tns
Tn, 13th Sig Bn
Tn, LW/CI 191 MID
Tn, 245th PsyOps Co
Tn, 5th Weather Sqdn

2 2d Brigade 101st Abn

Maneuver Battalions

1/321 Arty (DS)
A Btry (105)
B Btry (105)
C Co, 326th Engr (DS)
B Co, 326th Med (Spt)
Plt, 101 MP Co (DS)
Tn, 101 MI (DS)
2d FASCIF, 501st Sig (Spt)
Plt, 265th RRC (DS)
334th PI (spt)
RR Tn, 53d Sig

3 3d Brigade

Maneuver Battalions

1/21st Arty (DS)
B Btry (105)
C Btry (105)
C Btry 1/77 (105)
C Co, 8th Engr (DS)
Plt, 545th MP Co
2 Sqds, 34th Inf Plat (Scout dog)
Det Pathfinders
3 LRRP Tns
Tn, 13th Sig Bn
Tn LW/CI/191 MID
Tn 245th PsyOps Co
Tn, 5th Weather Sqdn

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4 Maneuver Battalions

1/5 Cav
1/8 Cav
1/12 Cav
1/501 Abn
2/501 Abn
1/502 Abn
1/7 Cav
5/7 Cav
2/12 Cav

5 Division Artillery

Hq Btry
E Btry, 82d Arty (AVN) (-) GS
2/20 Arty (-) GS
1/30 Arty GS
A 1/30 (155 How)
B 1/30 (155 How)
C 2/11 (155 How)
5th 155 Gun Btry (reinf) (155/8" How) (USMC)

6 Division Troops

HRG, 1st Air Cav Div (-)
1/9 Cav Sqdn (-)
8th Engr Bn (-)
13th Sig Bn
11th Avn Gp (-)
571st RR Co
545th MP Co (-)
Tm, 41st CA Co
184th Cnl Det (-)
Det (-), 5th Weather Sqdn

(b) During the period 19 thru 31 January 1968, the 1st ACD (-) conducted a tactical move to Iia Lo and consolidated forces for a commitment into the Job Stuart AO. Initial reconnaissance of the Job Stuart AO, indicated the presence of a considerable number of major NVA and VC units. On 27 January the Division Command Post moved from Gia Lo to Camp Evans and established the Division Base Camp for operations in the AO. The Brigade and Maneuver Battalions of the Division used the last 10 days of January to position forces and establish fire bases from which offensive operations could be launched against enemy base areas 101 and 114.

d. Combat Developments

(1) Sandia Devices

(a) On 7 and 8 November LTC Moore, ACTIV project officer, and two tech representatives from the Sandia Corporation delivered three Sandia seismic intrusion devices to the division and conducted new equipment training for personnel from Div Arty, G-3, and 1/9 Cav. The device was initially employed by 2/19 Arty in conjunction with an artillery ambush along a trail three kilometers west of LZ English. A total of five sets were issued to the division during November. The 2/19th and 1/77th Arty Bns each employed two; the remaining set was issued to 1/9 Cav.

(b) All sets were employed in areas of known VC activity in an attempt to detect movement at night. Artillery or mortar concentrations were registered in the areas and were fired whenever movement was detected. To date there have been no confirmed kills; however, blood-stained bandages and two badly damaged NVA helmets were found in the vicinity of two of the detectors. In addition, an EW report revealed

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that NVA soldiers have been warned to avoid a trail on which four of the detectors have been installed. The prisoner stated that he did not know the source of US intelligence; however, every time his unit used this trail they were hit by artillery.

(c) In general the sets have functioned well. By attaching an SCR 292 antenna to the indicator, units can employ the detectors at ranges up to ten kilometers. Some units have experienced difficulty in keeping the indicator batteries charged. One detector was destroyed by artillery fire; another is missing and presumed to be in enemy hands. As of the close of this reporting period two sets are with 2/19 Arty in the Jeb Stuart AO; two sets are being employed by 1/77 Arty in the Pershing AO. The indicator for the fifth set is inoperable.

(d) On 31 Jan GPT Downing, the current project officer, delivered 15 portable seismic intrusion detectors to the division. The maximum effective range of these sets is approximately 500 meters. They have been issued to infantry battalions for use on ambush patrols, OP's, and similar local security missions.

(2) Armed/Armored CH-47 Helicopter (ACH-47). On 9 November USARV informed this division that the AACH-47 evaluation had been terminated as of 15 October. The division was authorized to keep the two aircraft if it desired; however, no additional personnel were authorized to operate them. Plans were made to disband the AACH-47 detachment on 30 November. This was subsequently changed; the aircraft have remained operational throughout the reporting period. ACTIV's report was forwarded for our review on 19 November. It was returned to ACTIV with our concurrence o/a 20 December.

(3) Anti-Intrusion Devices

(a) AN/PSR-1. A total of 108 AN/PSR-1 anti-intrusion devices were issued to the division in late October. Each combat battalion was issued four; the remainder were issued to base defense units at An Khe. The device is ideally suited for early warning around static defensive positions. Results of employment during the reporting period were generally satisfactory.

(b) MCID. On 15 November a tech rep from USARV introduced the multi-purpose concealed intrusion detector (MCID) to the division. This device consists of a wire loop buried in the ground which detects any metal object which may be carried across it. Due to the time required to install it the device is best suited for early warning around permanent or semi-permanent bases. One set provides approximately 500 feet of coverage. The division received an initial issue of eight MCID's in early December. A total of 18 will be issued during FY 68. Two sets will be issued to each of the brigades, Div Arty, and 1/9 Cav. The remaining sets will be reserved for base defense.

(4) Night Vision Devices. On 5 November, 71 additional individual night weapons sights (starlight scopes) were issued to units throughout the division. Each infantry battalion now has a total of 37; the ultimate objective is 40 in each battalion. The scopes are extremely popular in most units. They have been used successfully on night ambushes and, to a limited extent, on night hunter missions. The division has a total of 72 crew served night weapons sights; 24 of these have been issued to 1/50th Mech. The division also has on hand nine medium range night observation devices. Due to their size, weight and excellent range capability they are well-suited for employment by artillery units on OP's or at fire bases. All nine have been issued to Div Arty for this purpose.

(5) Stripper Clip Ammunition. On 9 November the division concluded its evaluation of stripper clip ammunition, pre-packaged 10 round clips of 5.56mm ammunition which allow the soldier to load his magazines quickly and easily. The clips are immensely popular with all units. The division recommended them as a substitute for pre-loaded,

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disposable magazines. The division also recommended that nine-round clips be produced to facilitate loading 18 rounds in each magazine.

(6) XM-166 - 169 Smoke Signals. These are miniature smoke pots, roughly the size of a 35mm film canister. They are a convenient substitute for smoke grenades for marking targets and LZ's in open terrain. Burning time, however, is too short to allow the smoke to penetrate dense jungle canopy. The division recommended they be issued in limited quantity.

(7) Caliber .45 and .38 Multiple Part Ammunition. The division was issued 10,000 rounds last summer for evaluation. To date none has been fired in combat. USARV has approved an extension of the evaluation through February 1968.

(8) Airborne Survey System (AABC). Div Arty continued their evaluation of the AABC survey system throughout the reporting period. Surveys conducted on 11 and 15 January were compared with fourth order surveys. Computed AABC survey points were 4.27 meters southeast and 5.4 meters southwest of the fourth order survey points. FADAC tapes are still required to ease the burden of computation. A radio altimeter and a hoversight have also been requested. Div Arty plans to use the system extensively in the Jeb Stuart AO.

(9) AN/PRC-74. The AN/PRC-74, while not a developmental item, is a new, low power, transistorized, single sideband radio which provides either voice or CW communication where direct line of sight is not possible. The division received an initial issue of 33 AN/PRC-74's in late 1966. Forty-five additional sets were received in December 1967. Each infantry battalion now has five sets, brigade headquarters two to four, and 1/9 Cav twelve.

(10) SS-11 Anti-Personnel (APERS) Warheads. A total of 50 SS-11 APERS warheads were issued for evaluation in February 1967. Twenty-six have been fired since the evaluation began in May 1967. One warhead was lost in a fire at 2/20 Arty's ASP in September; another was found to be unserviceable and was turned in; one is still on hand at 2/20 Arty. The remaining 21 warheads were destroyed in the fire which levelled the ASP at LZ English in June. Results of the 26 firings have been submitted to USARV. The warhead has functioned well; unfortunately, 2/20 Arty has not had the opportunity to employ it against troops in the open. The division has recommended that USAMC conduct tests under controlled conditions to compare the effects of the APERS and AT warheads against personnel targets.

(11) Experimental Materials Handling Device (Conex Handler). The 15th S&S Bn evaluated a light-weight, mobile device for loading, unloading, and moving Conex containers in forward Class II/IV supply points. The device can only be operated on level ground; therefore, it is unserviceable for use by the division. A final report was submitted to USARV in December.

(12) Cargo Restraint/Load Limiters. This is an experimental tie-down device for CH-47's. The 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion was issued 72 for evaluation during December 1967. The device proved to be too complicated and too time consuming for use on our CH-47's. The standard tie-down strap is more satisfactory for the type loads and short turn around times experienced in the 1st Cavalry Division in CH-47 operations. A final report was submitted to USARV in January 1968.

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(13) Luminescent Runway Markers. Two sets were delivered to the 11th Avn Gp for evaluation during December 1967. Both sets were installed on the airfield at LZ English. The sets were easy to install, and training personnel for installation was not complicated. The major deficiencies noted were:

(a) The lights burned out quickly and could not be repaired.

(b) The lights could not be seen beyond two miles from the runway (five miles is required).

(c) The unipods broke and could not be repaired.
A final report on effectiveness and recommended improvements was submitted during January 1968.

c. Training

(1) Division Schools.

Division Training Center. The division training center will remain at An Khe during Operation Job Stuart. During the past quarter a total of 5,507 officers and enlisted men attended replacement training; 124 division soldiers and 6 ARVN NCO's graduated from the Combat Leaders Course. Maj Andrew T. Uswa replaced LTC Christian F. Dubia as commandant of the division training center on 10 December.

(2) Non-division Schools

(a) Aviation. The division sent 177 personnel to Army Aviation Technical Assistance Program (AAMTAP) classes at Vung Tau. Courses included aircraft supply; airframe, engine, and avionics maintenance. Twenty-seven aviators completed pilot transition courses on the AH-1G, Huey Cobra, at Bien Hoa. 80 crew chiefs and mechanics attended AH-1G armament, airframe, engine, and avionics courses.

(b) Recoonda. Eight members of E Co, 52d Inf (IRRP) attended class R-8-68 at the MACV Recoonda School at Nha Trang during the quarter; six graduated. Eight are currently attending class R-10-68.

(c) Artillery Training. In January I FFORCEV established a forward observer (FO) school at An Khe and a fire direction officer (FDO) school at Pleiku. Div Arty disbanded its own FO school and had planned to send all newly assigned FO's to the course at An Khe. This is being re-evaluated in light of the division's recent move to I CTZ. Div Arty will continue to train its own FDO's as it has in the past.

(a) Aviation Training

1. Pilot transition training on the OH-6A was conducted at An Khe under the assistant division aviation officer (ADAO). A total of 39 aviators completed transition training on the OH-6A this quarter.

2. An OH-13 maintenance training team from Bell Helicopter Co conducted on-site training for personnel from 1/9 Cav and E/82d Arty. The training to date has been highly beneficial. By conducting the classes in the units' maintenance areas, the instructors can correct improper procedures and improve the quality of organizational maintenance.

(3) ARVN/RF/FF Training

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(a) Division CMTT/CMTT trained 34 Regional Force companies and 58 Popular Force platoons. In December one CMTT was transferred from Phu Bon to Binh Dinh Province to train PF units guarding key bridges on QL1. This team is currently operating in Phu My District. On 21 January the CMTT and CMTT originally assigned to Phu Yen Province were transferred to Binh Dinh Province. The division was not relieved of its CMTT/CMTT responsibilities in II CTZ when it moved to I CTZ.

(b) On 13 Dec a conference was held in Floika to evaluate the effectiveness of the CMTT/CMTT program. IAG Rosson, CG I FFORCEV, and IAG Vinh Loc, CG II Corps, were co-chairmen of the conference. MG Tolson and representatives from ACofS, G-3 and the Division Training Center attended. Both the US and Vietnamese representatives agreed that the program had been successful and should be continued. IAG Vinh Loc directed the Vietnamese division commanders in II Corps to provide teams, similar to those already provided by US forces, in early 1968.

(4) M16A1 Rifle Training

(a) In view of the recent emphasis given the M16A1 rifle, the division training center now takes the following action to insure that each replacement reports to the field properly trained and armed with a serviceable, zeroed weapon.

- 1 Requires each replacement to report to the training center with his assigned individual weapon.
- 2 Insures that each trainee zeroes and test fires his assigned weapon.
- 3 Inspects to insure that each replacement has a copy of the "M16 Rifle Tips" card and that each officer and NCO has a copy of the "M16 PM Indicators" card.
- 4 Conducts two hours training for replacements on the care and cleaning of individual weapons in the field.
- 5 Instructs students attending the Combat Leaders Course in techniques of inspecting the M16A1. In addition, the 27th Maint Bn provides a maintenance contact team to inspect each replacement's weapon for serviceability and, if necessary, make repairs on the spot.

(b) AG Publications has issued 15,000 copies of USARV Pamphlet 350-50, a reprint of a "PS Magazine" article on care and cleaning of the M16A1. An additional 10,000 copies have been issued to the division training center for distribution to replacements. The "M16 PM Indicators" card was issued to all supervisory personnel down through squad leader. "M16 Tips" cards have been ordered for all division personnel.

(5) USARV Training Seminar. The division training officer presented a 30 minute lecture on combat refresher training at the USARV training seminar in Long Binh on 29 November. Each US division gave a 30 minute talk on a particular phase of training in Vietnam. Topics included leadership training, replacement training, and mobile training teams.

f. Doctrine

The division processed the following documents this quarter:

- (1) Drafted a Cav Circular on practice alerts at Camp Radcliff.
- (2) Wrote a division SOP on handling and firing anti-personnel (Bochive) ammunition.
- (3) Wrote a division SOP on the techniques of controlling aerial rocket artillery (ARA).

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(4) Reviewed and submitted comments to USARV on ST 17-31-1, The Armored Cavalry Squadron.

(5) Reviewed and submitted comments to USARV on USACD's proposed draft of FM 54-2, The Division Support Command.

(6) Reviewed and submitted comments to the US Army Aviation School on their proposed draft of ST 57-20-1, Air Movements Guide.

C. TOE/MTOE Action

(1) MTOE for Non-Divisional Air Cavalry Squadrons. At USARV's request this division reviewed a proposed MTOE for non-divisional air cav squadrons. USARV had considered standardizing all air cav squadrons in-country. The non-divisional MTOE, however, cannot be applied to divisional squadrons. It includes additional administrative and support personnel not required by divisional units. In addition USARV requested our comments on a proposal to replace the wheeled vehicles in D Troop with M-113 personnel carriers. The division did not concur; this would seriously reduce the squadron's degree of airmobility. However, the requirement for a lightly armored, highly mobile, amphibious vehicle which can be transported by CH-47 helicopter remains valid.

(2) DA has approved the MTOE for the airmobile infantry battalion and the airmobile DS artillery battalion. Implementing general orders have not yet been published.

4. Logistics

a. General: During the period 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68 combat service support was provided initially for three major operations: Byrd, Pershing, and Wheeler/Wallowa. On 15 January the division was given the mission to redeploy its forces to Operation Jeb Stuart. The 1st and 3d Brigades with their accompanying FSE's and the 3d FSE which supported the 2d Bn, 7th Cav redeployed to the new area of operation during the period.

(1) The 1st Brigade was the first unit to redeploy from Operation Pershing to Operation Jeb Stuart, and was accompanied by the 2d FSE which moved with the brigade from LZ English by C-130 to Phu Bai air facility and then to LZ El Paso. The brigade remained at El Paso from 17 to 19 Jan and then moved to LZ Jane. On 22 Jan the FSE moved from El Paso to Quang Tri La Vang and on 29 Jan the brigade collocated with the FSE at La Vang and established LZ Betty.

(2) The 3d Brigade deployed from Operation Wheeler/Wallowa to Operation Jeb Stuart, moving from LZ Baldy to Camp Evans with the Provisional FSE. The move was initiated on 24 Jan and the FSE became operational at Camp Evans on 31 Jan.

(3) In mid January the 2d Brigade assumed the responsibility for Operation Pershing and the FSA team at LZ Uplift was moved hurriedly to Qui Nhon. This move required immediate adjustment of FSE-FSA operations and redistribution of FSE personnel and equipment to provide continuous support of all units in the AO. The FSE headquarters is presently at LZ Uplift with the personnel and equipment split between Uplift and English.

(4) The 2d Bn, 7th Cav was relieved from responsibility of Operation Byrd and returned to division control. Op Con 2d Brigade in Operation Pershing. The 3d FSE moved from Phan Thiet to LZ El Paso on 21 Jan where it replaced the 2d FSE in supporting the division base. When the division headquarters moved from El Paso to Camp Evans the FSE moved with DISCOM to Phu Bai with the intent of subsequently moving to Camp Evans to combine with the Provisional FSE where it would support the 3d Brigade and the division base. However, before the move could be

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accomplished the tactical situation via Hue closed the road making the move impossible and caused the FSE to remain at Phu Bai.

b. Major Problem Areas: During the period no major problems were encountered until the move to Operation Jeb Stuart was initiated on 15 January. Although the move had been planned and published as a contingency in OPLAN 37-67, the detailed planning by division units had not been completed. When the order to move was received, the extremely short reaction time did not allow for further planning. The shortcoming in detailed planning was overcome by determined efforts on the part of all personnel in spite of numerous perplexing changes and unforeseen difficulties.

(1) The most immediate difficulty encountered upon arrival in the new AO was the absence of refuel facilities for helicopters. The POL distribution system deployed with the first elements of the division, but it required two days to install the refuel point at LZ El Paso and haul in adequate quantities of JP-4. During the two day interim helicopter operations were severely limited because of the lack of fuel. A tactical emergency was declared and fuel was furnished from Marine airbases until the organic facilities became operational.

(2) Another source of difficulty was caused by the shortage of trucks in the area. During Operation Pershing, the division was augmented by an attached light truck company. With this attachment the division was able to adequately accomplish its local haul requirements; however, the truck company remained in the Pershing AO leaving the division handicapped at the out set. This handicap was first felt when elements arrived at Phu Bai and sufficient trucks were not on hand to move troops and equipment from the airfield to the division base.

(3) The full impact of the shortage of trucks in the Jeb Stuart AO was felt when it became necessary to levy trucks from division units to accomplish line haul of supplies into the division.

(4) Division reacted to the lack of sufficient transportation by controlling all available assets, both trucks and helicopters at division level, and through rigid and judicious management was able to get maximum utilization from what was available. In addition critically needed items of supply were brought in by air drop.

(5) A final difficulty which compounded the problems involved in the move to the new AO was the subsequent move of the division base from LZ El Paso to Camp Evans and the moves of the 1st Brigade base from El Paso to LZ Jane and from Jane to LZ Betty. Each move delayed the support units of the division in becoming operational at their full capacity and greatly reduced the efficiency of organic support operations. However, because of the determined effort of all personnel and stringent management of resources, the fighting units of the 1st Cav received the support necessary to continue full scale offensive operations against the enemy.

5. G5

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations: Efforts were directed toward support of combat operations in the Pershing AO, and continuation of civic action in the TAOR.

6. (C) Commander's Observations and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence:

(1) ITEM: Interrogation of PW's

DISCUSSION: The Vietnamese do not classify inlaws as relatives.

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OBSERVATION: When questioning the Vietnamese about relatives, the interrogator must refer to inlaws as a separate group.

(2) ITEM: Interrogation of Communist Party Members

DISCUSSION: Communist party members always hold positions of trust in NVA units and can usually be expected to have more information and knowledge about operational units than other PW's.

OBSERVATION: Particular emphasis should be placed on Communist party members.

c. Operations:

(1) ITEM: Mechanized Operations

DISCUSSION: Units conducting mechanized operations in heavy vegetation should check the area thoroughly, especially tree lines and hedgerows, and recon by fire whenever possible. Each track should have an M-79 grenadier assigned to it and should carry at least five M72 LAW's to clear bunkers. Tracks and dismounted troops should advance on line together. Bunkers must be destroyed or cleared as the unit advances. Enemy soldiers crouching in partially destroyed bunkers and trenches have waited until the assaulting unit was past, then surfaced and fired into the rear of it.

OBSERVATION: Tracks and dismounted infantry must provide mutual support. Bunkers, spider holes and other hiding areas must be cleared as the unit advances. A second assault line is often useful to clear these areas and allow the lead unit to continue its advance.

(2) ITEM: Combined Operations

DISCUSSION: ARVN units often lack a communications capability equal to our own. Many of them are not thoroughly familiar with US methods of Operations.

OBSERVATION: US units conducting combined operations with ARVN units must insure through detailed, personal coordination that the ARVN units are aware of routes of movement, location of adjacent units, and fields of fire. Detailed coordination is essential for safe, successful combined operations.

(3) ITEM: Booby Traps

DISCUSSION: Mines and booby traps still account for a high percentage of US casualties. Units discovering new types of booby traps or new techniques of avoiding them must spread the word to adjacent units and higher headquarters.

OBSERVATION: The following techniques should be considered:

(a) A double point should be used whenever possible. Even in dense terrain it should operate a minimum of ten meters in front of the nearest troops. The point must be prepared to take cover immediately if a booby trap is tripped.

(b) A thin flexible branch, three or four feet long, can often be used to detect trip wires. The point man should carry it loosely with the tip close to the ground. When the branch contacts a trip wire it will bend without dislocating the wire.

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(c) Key personnel should be dispersed throughout the formation to prevent the loss of more than one should a booby trap be activated.

(d) The M26 grenade safety spoon makes a distinct sound as it frees itself from the grenade. Point men should be alert for this and similar warnings which may provide even a fraction of a second reaction time.

(4) ITEM: Techniques of Movement

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that the techniques prescribed in field manuals and taught at Army service schools are valid. Most units which get into trouble have generally neglected these techniques due to carelessness or haste.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must continue to emphasize proper movement techniques. Double points should be used whenever possible. Flank security is essential even in rugged terrain. Units should move by bounds and always maintain part of the force as a reserve. Commanders should refrain from assigning rigid time limits to subordinate units. This often results in hasty and careless movement to the final objective or pickup zone.

(5) ITEM: Police of Landing Zones

DISCUSSION: The engine on a CH-54 helicopter failed just as it landed in a forward LZ. Cause of failure was a foreign item which had been ingested into the turbine. The helicopter had just delivered a 105mm howitzer. Had the failure occurred during landing, the results would have been disastrous.

OBSERVATION: Units must continuously insure that landing zones are policed prior to the arrival of cargo helicopters.

(6) ITEM: 4.2 Inch Mortars for Base Defense

DISCUSSION: The acquisition of 4.2 inch mortars by 1/9 Cav significantly increased the fire power available for base defense of the Two Bits complex. Their fires were used to supplement M-42 "Duster" and 81mm mortar fires in the nightly interdiction of known enemy approach routes into the Two Bits/Bong Son area. They also provided an immediately responsive means of support for combat patrols and ambushes operating in the Two Bits's base defense area. They were used extensively to supplement artillery interdiction of the "VC Valley" area (northwestern Cay Giap). Finally, they offered an alternate source of illumination that could be most important during the rainy season. These weapons were obtained on a 90 day loan. The division has no intention of submitting a TOE change request, because the 81mm mortar is more suitable for normal operations. However, since the 4.2 has proven so useful for base defense, a request is being prepared for special authorization to retain it on temporary loan for this purpose.

OBSERVATION: AR 310-34 authorizes units to draw special items of equipment on temporary loan for 180 days. One extension of 180 days may be authorized on each loan. Units should take maximum advantage of this procedure rather than submit MFOE for special items of equipment.

(7) ITEM: Utilization of Aero Scout and Aero Weapons Helicopters.

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DISCUSSION: The division's air cavalry squadron regularly used its aero weapons teams (red teams) for wide-ranging reconnaissance on the periphery of the division's AO. The UH-1 helicopter due to its greater power and heavier armament is better suited for reconnaissance in rugged, mountainous terrain where enemy base areas generally exist. The OH-13 scout helicopter is used primarily in the lowlands and in populated areas where its low speed, excellent visibility and excellent maneuverability are used to maximum advantage.

OBSERVATION: Air cavalry commanders must consider the performance characteristics of their aircraft when planning reconnaissance missions.

(8) ITEM: Tracked Vehicles for D Troop, 1/9 Cavalry

DISCUSSION: The wheeled vehicles currently authorized in the ground cavalry troop of the air cavalry squadron are basically road-bound in Vietnam. This division stated a requirement in 1966 for a lightly armored, highly mobile, amphibious personnel carrier which can be transported by CH-47.

OBSERVATION: This requirement is still valid. Vehicles such as the M116 should be considered for field test in Vietnam.

(9) ITEM: Reduction in Artillery Ammunition Expenditures

DISCUSSION: Division Artillery was tasked to reduce ammunition expenditures in the Pershing AO in November to 75-80% of the expenditure for October. This was accomplished. The reduction amounted to 26.5%.

OBSERVATION: It is significant that no mandatory reduction of ammunition expenditure was imposed by this headquarters. Reductions were realized as the normal result of a directed, formalized targeting sequence and skilled utilization of target gathering agencies already existing or available to the division. It is not possible to quantify completely the effects of reducing ammunition expenditures. It is possible to state that, during the month, the reduction did not significantly alter the favorable ratio of combat power which this division enjoyed over the enemy in the Pershing AO. Div Arty will continue to improve its planned fire programs. However, the monsoon season may make it necessary to increase planned artillery fires to compensate for reduced mobility and limited air operations. Enemy activity may increase. It is impossible to predict whether the current rate of expenditures can continue without a tactical gain for the enemy. Further reductions are not considered warranted at this time. Rather, expenditures should be based on valid intelligence related to enemy actions and/or intentions.

(10) ITEM: Mine Sweep Techniques

DISCUSSION: Lengthy deliberate mine sweeps (in excess of 5 miles) are mentally and physically fatiguing to sweep team personnel.

OBSERVATION: When employing a deliberate mine sweep in excess of 5 miles, three teams should be committed and rotated frequently along the route of the sweep.

(11) ITEM: Availability of Gunships

DISCUSSION: The division's aviation group has consistently been unable to provide sufficient gunships to meet division requirements. Division aviation battalions are authorized only 12 gunships to support 60 lift ships, the ratio in the 1st Aviation Brigade is 24 gunships to 69 liftships.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

OBSERVATION: This division is preparing a request for MTOE to provide additional gunships in the assault helicopter battalions.

(12) ITEM: Combat Assaults

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that maintaining a tight formation during the enroute flight affords better control. Routes to the RF should be curved instead of straight to allow the flight leader a greater margin for adjusting his timing and spacing. Marking rounds should be placed downwind from the LZ and left or right of the flight path to permit the pilots to maintain good visual contact all the way to the ground. Aircraft should be spaced 15 seconds apart to insure fast efficient unloading on one-ship LZ's.

OBSERVATION: The techniques discussed above are considered critical in planning and executing combat assaults particularly on one-ship LZ's. Commanders should continually emphasize them;

(13) ITEM: Night Illumination During Tactical Emergencies

DISCUSSION: During two tactical emergencies in December employing CH-47 aircraft, supported units failed to provide continuous illumination. Apparently ground units feel the only time a pilot needs illumination is on short final. This is erroneous. Illumination also provides a safety margin by outlining high terrain in the immediate area. Intermittent lighting is an added hazard, because the human eye cannot respond to rapid changes. Continuous light is the safest means of illumination.

(14) ITEM: Fire Power Coordination in Multi-Unit Operations

DISCUSSION: During the 6 December contact on the Bong Son Plain (Battle of Tam Quan), one infantry battalion commander was placed in control of all maneuver units; in conjunction with that, his artillery liaison officer was placed in control of all fire support in the area, and of the observers on the ground. This led to a minimum of confusion and errors and a maximum safe utilization of fire power means.

OBSERVATION: When elements of two or more battalions are in close contact with the same enemy force, the liaison officer attached to the maneuver commander in charge of the situation must be the only fire support coordinator for the action. He must be collocated with the maneuver commander and must insure that the forward observers are aware of company boundaries and fire coordination lines.

(15) ITEM: Complimentary Use of CS and Artillery

DISCUSSION: During the 6 December contact, bunker-foxhole complexes were attacked by first delivering a short, but heavy-volume artillery preparation, followed immediately by a CS attack by AAA. After giving the gas a few minutes to take effect, another heavy preparation, using fuze quick and fuze VT, was fired catching numerous enemy out of their holes attempting to avoid the gas.

OBSERVATION: The use of CS in conjunction with artillery appears to be an effective technique. Its use should be considered for future operations.

(16) ITEM: Necessity of Heavy Artillery Coverage

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

DISCUSSION: Prior to the 6 December contact vicinity BS 9106, A/7/15th Arty, an 8-inch battery stationed at LZ English, had been retubed with 175mm tubes and displaced from the Pershing AO, leaving only B/7/15th Arty to provide 8 inch support in the entire Pershing AO. The decision was made to split B Btry leaving two howitzers at LZ Uplift, and move the other two into A/7/15th Arty's old position at LZ English. The two guns were actually on the road when the contact broke out; however, firing was delayed for several hours while the guns moved into position and prepared to fire. The need for an entire battery of 8 inch guns was apparent, but this could not be provided without leaving the southern half of the Pershing AO without 8 inch support. As it was, contact was made in the southern portion of the AO on 14 December, and the two 8 inch guns at Uplift were used extensively.

OBSERVATION: Eight-inch artillery support must be available throughout the area of operations. The "roving battery" concept, wherein an 8 inch battery is displaced from fire base to fire base depending on firepower needs, is not an acceptable solution because of the delay incumbent in the move. Timely fires are often the determining factor in a battle. It is imperative in the Pershing AO under present circumstances that at least two batteries of 8 inch howitzers be available for support, one north of the Bong Son River and one south of it.

d. Logistics

(1) ITEM: Ammunition Handling Safety

DISCUSSION: Supply personnel were transporting packaged 81mm HE mortar rounds from issue point to firing point. It was assumed that the ammunition was in its original packing with all safety devices properly installed and could be handled as desired. As one box was being placed in the ammunition storage bunker at the firing point it exploded and simultaneously detonated the other rounds in the bunker. Results: three US KIA and six WIA. Upon investigation, removal of unexploded rounds from their containers revealed that safety pins were missing from the fuzes. Rough handling, in this case, caused the round to arm and additional rough handling caused it to detonate.

OBSERVATION: All mortar ammunition must be inspected at the ASP before it is issued. If the seals are not intact the individual rounds must be inspected to insure that safety devices are in place and that the rounds are dry and serviceable. Particular attention must be paid to ammunition which has been back hauled from units in the field. All ammunition which has been issued must be thoroughly inspected before it is reissued.

(2) ITEM: Hook Damage

DISCUSSION: A CH-54A had its cargo hook damaged while picking up a 155mm Howitzer. The swinging hook made contact with the howitzer with such force that the mechanical release was extensively damaged. The hook would no longer function, therefore the use of the CH-54A was lost for the duration of the mission.

OBSERVATION: Hookup crews must grasp the hook while completing the hook-up so as to prevent the swinging hook from striking the piece of equipment to be transported. Maximum command emphasis and training must be devoted to hook-up procedures and deter all attempts to place the clevis on a swinging hook.

(3) ITEM: Transportation for Line Haul of Supplies to the FSA's.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

DISCUSSION: When the division moved into I CTZ sufficient trucks were not available to haul supplies to the division. To overcome this critical situation trucks were levied from the subordinate units to help bring in supplies. This impaired the operations of the units and supplies remained at a critically low level.

OBSERVATION: Trucks must be prepositioned by the logistical support agency to haul supplies to units when they arrive in the area.

(4) ITEM: Pre-positioning of Essential Supplies

DISCUSSION: In preparation for the contingency plan OPLAN 37-67 arrangements were made for the pre-positioning of ammunition at Phu Bai and Quang Tri. However, when the division base moved to Camp Evans and the road was closed between Phu Bai and Camp Evans by enemy action this stockage was of no use. The stockage at Quang Tri was not adequate for the whole division and transportation was not available to haul it to the FSA's.

OBSERVATION: Prior to the movement of a brigade or larger size unit into a new area, critical supplies (ammunition, POL, and rations) must be pre-stocked and provisions made for getting them to the FSA on a timely basis.

(5) ITEM: Placement of Material Handling Equipment (MHE) to Support Large Scale Moves

DISCUSSION: On the air movement to the new AO large quantities of general cargo was shipped on pallets. Much of this cargo was essential equipment which was needed immediately upon arrival. However a great deal of difficulty was encountered at the air field because of non-availability of forklifts and even more difficulty was encountered at the new base camp for the same reason. In the ASP at Camp Evans again there was no MHE for unloading ammunition.

OBSERVATION: In a move which involves bulk cargo MHE must be moved prior to the cargo or pre-positioned to facilitate air field clearance and destination off loading.

(6) ITEM: Preparation of Loading Plans

DISCUSSION: Many units prepared loading plans and submitted movement plans accordingly, but when they arrived at the departure airfield they had larger quantities of equipment than they had requested transportation for. This caused movement schedules to be adjusted and generally created delay and confusion of the entire operation.

OBSERVATION: Units must prepare accurate loading plans and stick to them.

(7) ITEM: Establishment of Movement Priorities

DISCUSSION: Many units moved by air various items of non-essential gear such as furniture, refrigerators, showers, etc. This misuse of air transportation caused other operational essential items to be delayed in movement.

OBSERVATION: Commanders of all units must insure that all non-combat essential gear is placed in the land tail and only combat essentials are moved by air. Priority list must be made and adhered to.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(8) ITEM: Use of CH-47 Helicopters for Airfield Clearance

DISCUSSION: When units arrived at Phu Bai Air Facility much of the equipment such as howitzers and bundles of ammunition were pre-rigged for sling out. Had a CH-47 been available these combat essential items could have been moved immediately to position. As it was the sling rigged bundles were extremely difficult to handle with fork lifts and trucks.

Mules which were combat loaded offered the same difficulty. They had to be unloaded by hand, the contents placed on trucks, and the mules themselves placed on trucks by hand. Had a CH-47 been available they could have been slung or carried internally to position.

OBSERVATION: In tactical moves use of CH-47 helicopters should be planned for moving certain combat essentials from the arrival airfield to the combat position.

(9) ITEM: Unit Marking of All Equipment

DISCUSSION: Some units experienced difficulty in identifying their equipment when it arrived in the new area. This was particularly true of Conex containers and other look alike items.

OBSERVATION: Each unit must have a distinctive mark which is clearly visible on all items of equipment.

(10) ITEM: Advance Parties

DISCUSSION: Many units arrived without knowing where to go or what to do when they arrived. This caused a large amount of confusion at the airfield and at the new base.

OBSERVATION: Every effort must be made to get advance parties from each unit into the new area early, with transportation and communications.

(11) ITEM: Transportation for Airfield Clearance.

DISCUSSION: In support of the move into the Phu Bai area, III MAF tasked subordinate Marine units at Phu Bai to provide 20 trucks for arrival airfield clearance. On the first day of the move thirteen (13) trucks showed up and on subsequent days various other reduced numbers of trucks were provided. The reduced amount of truck transportation was not adequate to accomplish airfield clearance in a timely manner.

OBSERVATION: When a large unit moves into a new AO the headquarters to which it is Op Con must provide sufficient transportation to move the unit from the airfield to its base.

(12) ITEM: Location of Division Maintenance Battalion

DISCUSSION: When the division moved from El Paso to Camp Evans the 27th Maintenance Battalion remained at Phu Bai. Shortly after the move the road between Phu Bai and Camp Evans was closed because of enemy action. This has separated the division base and all three brigades from the maintenance battalion severely limiting the capability of the battalion to maintain the vehicles of the division.

OBSERVATION: Whenever the division moves the 27th Maintenance Battalion must move also to be in a position to provide proper maintenance support to all units.

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(13) ITEM: Rigging of Airdrop Loads for Expenditious drop zone clearance;

DISCUSSION: The most rapid and efficient method of clearing heavy drop bundles from the drop zone is by use of the CH-47 helicopter. The 1st Cavalry Division frequently used this method in receiving supplies at Camp Evans. However much time was lost once the bundles landed in rigging them for sling out. If the bundles were pre-rigged prior to drop, the personnel on the DZ would only have to remove the parachute and attach the sling to the hook on the helicopter. The same sling would be used for both the parachute and the helicopter.

OBSERVATION: Resupply bundles should be rigged for helicopter sling out prior to drop, attaching the parachute to the same sling that will be used for sling out.

(14) ITEM: Air Movement of Supplies

DISCUSSION: Conex containers which are not properly mounted on Air Force pallets or exceed maximum tare weight, cause unnecessary delay in aircraft loading.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must insure proper loading and palletizing of Conex's through close supervision and inspection of loads.

(15) ITEM: Fragmentation of Medical Companies During Out-loading.

DISCUSSION: Fragmentation of medical units during outloading operations cuts unit effectiveness and causes loss of time in the accomplishment of medical missions.

OBSERVATION: Medical companies should not be fragmented during out-loading.

(16) ITEM: 6,000 lb Rough Terrain Forklifts

DISCUSSION: The 3,000 lb forklift organic to the 1st Cavalry Division has an unacceptable service life for normal FSE operations. The 6,000 lb rough terrain forklift is ideal for FSE operations and is transportable by C-130.

OBSERVATION: All 3,000 lb forklifts in the FSE's should be replaced by 6,000 lb forklifts.

(17) ITEM: Placement of Parachute Rigger Detachments at Each FSE.

DISCUSSION: Parachute rigger detachments at the FSE's greatly facilitate sling out operations and assist the units in forward areas in the retrograding of air delivery equipment.

OBSERVATION: Rigger detachments should be made a normal part of the FSE organization.

(18) ITEM: Efficient Maintenance of Aircraft Records

DISCUSSION: Unit maintenance personnel are not maintaining aircraft records in accordance with procedures outlined in appropriate publications. This causes the Direct Support Unit to expend an excessive number of manhours in correcting forms and records.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

OBSERVATION: Unit maintenance personnel should be instructed as to the importance of maintaining correct aircraft forms and records. Maximum command emphasis should be devoted to this subject.

(19) ITEM: TOE-29-87T

DISCUSSION: Forward Support Detachments are continually called on to provide recovery services for 2½ and 5 ton trucks, and to change major assemblies in these vehicles. Based on these requirements, the ¾ ton wreckers now authorized in the Forward Support Detachments are inadequate. Detachments "A" and "C" presently continue to use 5 ton wreckers, which are hand receipted from Headquarters and Main Support Company.

OBSERVATION: Experience to date has illustrated the inadequacy of TOE 29-87T to provide effective recovery and lift capability in the Forward Support Detachments. This problem has been fully justified and a 2½ ton wrecker along with trained operators have been requested in MROE 29-87T dated 20 October 1967.

(20) ITEM: Ration Requests

DISCUSSION: Units are not reporting changes in personnel strength as they occur. As a consequence, variations in requirements, not previously known by Class I personnel, result in unnecessary overages or shortages in rations. This is particularly true when units are preparing to move to new base areas, and during the initial occupation of those areas.

OBSERVATION: Strength changes for Class I purposes must be kept current with the FSE. Units should report operational attachments not included in the Morning Report in order to expedite the processing of ration requests.

(21) ITEM: Handling and Supply of Barrier Material

DISCUSSION: Prior to August 1967, all barrier material used by divisional units in An Khe was received directly from Qui Nhon by the Division Class II & IV yard. All issues of barrier material was made to units from the Class II & IV yard and to satisfy stockage requirements, it required a large storage area within the II & IV facility. Coordination was made with the 540th Engineer Co, AKSAC for the support of all barrier material and to eliminate existing stockage requirements.

OBSERVATION: Currently, all barrier material for use in the TAOR other than the heavy timber, i.e. 4x4 and larger, is requisitioned from the 540th Engineer Company for issue to units within the division. For those items not stocked at the Class II & IV, i.e. 4x4 timber and larger, requests are forwarded by Class II & IV, to the 540th Engineer Company for issue and pickup by the unit. The system now utilized has proven to be beneficial to the division in that the number of days of supply on hand at the Class II & IV yard has been substantially reduced and storage space is being effectively utilized for other resources.

(22) ITEM: Dirty LZ's

DISCUSSION: Dirty landing zones continue to be hazardous for aircraft, crews, and ground personnel. Items of debris most recently noted are empty sandbags, empty C-rations cartons and empty cargo nets.

OBSERVATION: Repeated emphasis must be placed on keeping landing zones well policed. Safe and timely resupply by air is dependent upon the absence of debris on landing zones.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(23) ITEM: Refueling Delays

DISCUSSION: Fuel management is a vital aspect of the CH-54A mission. As the load weight is increased the fuel load must be decreased proportionately. Refueling with hand nozzles at locations such as Dak To and LZ Baldy requires the aircraft to shut down, thereby greatly increasing refueling time.

OBSERVATION: At least one pressure refueling nozzle should be located at all major refueling areas to expedite refueling for CH-54A aircraft.

(24) ITEM: CH-54A Mission Performed

DISCUSSION: On 31 December 1967, the 478th Aviation Company accomplished another first for the CH-54A. As a test, two 105mm Howitzers were rigged and strapped side by side and lifted successfully in one combined lift. On 21 December 1967, 478th Aviation Company recovered two (2) UH-1's in one combined lift.

OBSERVATION: The results of this test indicate that it is feasible that one CH-54A could lift three 105mm Howitzers with basic loads of ammunition. UH-1's rigged and strapped side by side can be efficiently air lifted for retrograde movement.

c. Civil Affairs

(1) ITEM: Selective snatches for interrogation purposes.

DISCUSSION: In some cases innocent civilians have valuable intelligence but are hesitant to divulge information when extracted individually from an area because they are easily identified once they return.

OBSERVATION: Where possible it is better to extract two or three persons in a group to provide anonymity to that person inclined to give information.

(2) ITEM: Rice Storage

DISCUSSION: Province decrees the amount of rice people can store in their homes. Dissemination of this decree is extremely slow, especially outside areas under firm GVN control. This results in confusion among the local populace and causes ill feeling when rice above allowable limits is taken.

OBSERVATION: Although dissemination of such decrees is a GVN responsibility, US units should help, especially in contested areas. GVN officials can make tapes and prepare texts for leaflets which are then put out by US means.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

13 Inclosures

Withdrawn
Hqs. DA

~~1-Maintenance of Unit Strength~~
~~2-Personnel Management~~

3-Development and Maintenance of Morale

4-Information and History

5-Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order

6-Operations and Training Organization

7-Supply and Services

9-Facilities

11-Psychological Operations

~~12-1st Bde After Action Report, Battle of Tan Quan~~

~~13-1st Bde After Action Report, Operation Ho Chi Minh~~

GEORGE W. PUTNAM, JR.

COLONEL, GS

Chief of Staff

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Pub separately as CAAR 67X199
Not Received, Hqs. DA


91
AVFA-GC-OT (17 Mar 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WAGEAA 1st Cav Div (AM) (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 19 APR 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES P. GASTON
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
2 - ACSFOR, DA, Wash DC 20310

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AVHGC-DST (17 Mar 68) 2d Ind (C)

CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 15 ADD 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) as indorsed.
2. (C) Pertinent comment follows: Reference item concerning tracked vehicles for D Troop, 1/9 Cavalry, page 20, paragraph 6c(8). In March 1968, USARV submitted an ENSURE request for two prototype armored assault vehicles (airmobile) for evaluation. The first vehicle is scheduled to arrive in RVN in October or November of this year, and the second within six months afterwards. Both vehicles are slated for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). There is a good possibility that this vehicle will meet the division requirements for a cross country vehicle in the ground cavalry troop.
3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C. S. Nakatsukasa

C. S. NAKATSUKASA

Captain, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:

HQ I FFORCEV

HQ 1st Cav Div (AM)

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GPOP-DT (17 Mar 68) (U) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) for Period
Ending 31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. Shortt

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1966
Inclosure 3: Development and Maintenance of Morale

1. Morale throughout the division and attached elements remained excellent.

2. Decorations and Awards: (Awarded)

Medal of Honor	0
Distinguished Service Cross	9
Silver Star	134
Legion of Merit	9
Distinguished Flying Cross	185
Soldiers Medal	17
Bronze Star w/V	344
Bronze Star (Meritorious)	975
Air Medal w/V	84
Air Medal	13216
Army Commendation Medal w/V	344
Army Commendation Medal	1495
Purple Heart	448
Combat Infantry Badge	1499
Combat Medical Badge	106
Aircraft Crewman Badge	104

3. Special Services: During the reporting period 305 movies and TV shows were circulated throughout the division. 5 USO shows were presented to the troops. 4145 out-of-country and 959 in-country quotas for R & R were used.

4. Postal Services: Postal activities for the reporting period were as follows:

(a) Money Order Sales	NVAL
(b) Postal and Parcel Post fees	NVAL
(c) Incoming Mail	1051 tons
Daily Average	12 tons
(d) Outgoing mail	269 tons
Daily average	2.9 tons
(e) Number of Incoming Mail Days	88
(f) Number of Outgoing Mail Days	91

5. Financial Services:

(a) No specific items are noted based on operations during the reporting period.

(b) Highlights during the period:

Finance Forward Payday Teams have proved useful and feasible here. Teams were sent to LZ Baldy and to the Dak To area during the quarter. They delivered payrolls to unit agents to pay and accepted turnbacks in the field. In January, from the 14th through the 18th, \$154,000 was issued to 26 agents and 23 agents turned payrolls back in the field. This saved agent travel back to base camp in most cases.

6. Chaplain Activities:

(a). In a tactical move it is necessary to bring enough supplies and equipment so the office can operate for long periods of time without re-supply, also, there is little time for church activities.

(b) Lessons learned for the period is that the building of permanent or semi-permanent chapel structures and the concept of air mobility has to be re-evaluated.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 3: Development and Maintenance of Morale

7. Medical

a. Disease and injury statistical data:

(1) Injured as a result of hostile action (IRHA)	1255
(2) Non-battle injuries	532
(3) Disease	1724
(A) Malaria Total	264
a. Vivax	105
b. Falciparum	159
(B) Scrub Typhus	17
(C) Hook Worm	7
(D) Psychiatric cases	33
(E) Animal Bites	11
(F) Hepatitis	31
(G) Dengue Fever	2
(H) Others	1403
(4) Killed in Action:	264
(5) Remaining in Hospital: (In-country)	911

b. Discussion of Diseases:

(1) Malaria cases: The division had a total of 264 cases of malaria during the period, 1 November 67 through 31 January 1968 inclusive. This compares favorably with the 418 cases for the previous period. Of the 264 cases, 104 were due to plasmodium vivax.

(2) Experience gained for the previous quarters indicates that the malaria season in the Central Highlands ranges from March through November with a peak during the period of April through July.

c. Discussion of IRHA, WIA, and NEI

(1) KIA/IRHA ratio 89/455 or 1/5.11 was different from the ratio 1/4.87 observed in Korea.

(2) Types of IRHA's: During the reporting period 18 punji stake wounds occurred compared to 86 for the last reporting period.

(3) NEI: The total number of non-hostile injuries for this period was 141.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
 Inclosure 4: Office of Information and History

1. The Information Office continued to increase its service to the worlds press and division troops during the reporting period. The following is an analytical breakdown by function:

a. The Information Section operated forward press centers during the following operations:

Pershing	11 Feb 67 - 21 Jan 68
Byrd	26 Aug 66 - 21 Jan 68
Wallowa	1 Oct 67 - 24 Jan 68
Jeb Stuart	22 Jan 68 - continuing

b. The Information Section continued to place emphasis on hometowners both in radio and newspaper form.

HOMETOWNERS
1855

RADIO HOMETOWNERS
1006

c. Troop Topics emphasizing 1st Cavalry accomplishment were published each week and command information brochures were distributed on the following subjects:

- (1) Artillery Officers Course (2 Nov)
- (2) Con Men, Marijuana, and Mail (9 Nov)
- (3) Veterans' Day Message (16 Nov)
- (4) Educational Opportunities (30 Nov)
- (5) Info About Australia (7 Dec)
- (6) Enemy Force Strength (14 Dec)
- (7) Police Recruiting
- (8) Vietnamese New Year (TET) (14 Jan)
- (9) Reenlistment Benefits (11 Jan)
- (10) Uniform Services Pay Act 1967 (18 Jan)

d. One hundred and sixty-two (162) newsmen visited the division during the reporting period. They represented the following agencies:

Fairfield Daily Ledger	Time
MACV-IO	SEAPA
USARV-IO	Reuters
5th PID IFFV	German National TV
Contact Magazine	French Press
Newport News	Free Lance
Philippine Herald	UPI
Okinawa Morning Star	KMTV Omaha
Troy Daily News (Ohio)	AP
Washington Post	Smithsonian Institute
AEC	Newsweek
New York Times	Stars and Stripes
Australia TV-News	Look
CBS	DASPO
INS News	Public Broadcasting Laboratory
NEC	Honolulu Advertiser
Overseas Weekly	

e. The radio section produced the following news stories, interviews and editorial support, during the reporting period.

(1) Number of news stories (i.e. news copy) aired over AFRS An Khe totaled 978. Section SOP calls for two newscasts each day at 0805 and 1905. 1st Air Cavalry news headlines are aired at 2305.

(2) Number of taped interviews aired over AFRS An Khe during the period totaled 141. The interviews are usually featured during our local newscast. Nineteen (19) were sent to AFVN Saigon.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 4: Office of Information and History

(3) Continued to provide APTV Qui Nhon and Hue with war reports, news stories, taped interviews, Camp River recreational activities and slides.

(4) Number of regular taped hometown interviews sent to Hometown News Center, Kansas City totaled 1046.

(5) Continued to provide two newsletters each day totaling 184 newsletters for the period.

(6) Continued to provide, up to 20 January 1968, AFVN An Khe with 3 radio announcers each day giving the division approximately 14 hours of local broadcast time daily. AFVN Saigon provided the other 10 hours to complete the broadcast day. During the local time periods the announcers provided musical entertainment, local weather, information and news programs with emphasis on division policies.

f. The Photo Section of the Office of Information and History was responsible for taking and developing 7571 photos and making 27656 prints from selected negatives.

g. The Military Press Section, in addition to supporting with stories and editing, was responsible for the release of 704 stories and features during this reporting period, many gaining recognition in national papers such as the New York Times, Stars and Stripes, Chicago Tribune, Denver Post, Houston Chronicle, San Francisco Chronicle, Minneapolis Star, Louisville Courier-Journal and the Miami Herald.

h. Provided a report to USARV to publicize the role of the Army Aviation in Vietnam.

i. The publishing of the Cavalier in Tokyo at Stars and Stripes.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 5: Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order

1. Military Justice

- a. General Courts Martial: 10
- b. Special Courts Martial: 68
- c. Summary Courts Martial: 12

2. Inspector General Activities: No significant trends in complaints and or requests were revealed.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 6: Operations and Training Organization

1. On 11 November, 1/12 Cav OPCON to the 1 ACD in the Dazzlen TAOR, was placed OPCON to the 4th Inf Div in the MacArthur AO. The 2/5 Cav assumed the tactical mission in the Dazzlen TAOR.

2. On 13 November, the 1st Bde was placed OPCON to the 4th Inf Div in the MacArthur AO. Maneuver Bns OPCON to the 1st Bde in the MacArthur AO were the 1/12 Cav 2/8 Cav.

3. On 25 November, the 1st Bde (with 2/8 Cav) OPCON to the 4th Inf Div in the MacArthur AO, returned to the Pershing AO, OPCON to 1 ACD

4. On 9 December, TF 1/12 Cav which had been OPCON to the 4th Inf Div in the MacArthur AO, returned to the Pershing AO, placed OPCON to the 1st Brigade.

5. On 20 December the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment (Provisional) was officially redesignated as CS B, 527. Infantry (Long Range Patrol) and was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

6. On 17 Jan 68, 1/12 Cav was relieved by the 3/503, 173 Abn Bde in the Dazzlen TAOR. 1/12 Cav returned OPCON 1st Bde.

7. On 18 January, 1st Bde displaced by G-130 to the Jeb Stuart AO. 19 January, 1st Bde task organization: 1/5 Cav, 1/8 Cav, and 1/12 Cav.

8. On 21 January, 1 ACD assumed control of operations in the Jeb Stuart AO. The 2d Bde (2/5, 2/8, and 1/50) became OPCON I Field Force V and remained in the Pershing AO.

9. On 27 January, 1/7 Cav which had been OPCON to the 3d Bde in the Wallowa AO, became OPCON to the 1st Bde in the Jeb Stuart AO.

10. On 27 January, the 1/501, 101 Abn Div became OPCON to 1 ACD in the Jeb Stuart AO.

11. On 25 January, 3d Bde Hq (with 2/12 Cav) which had been OPCON to the Americal Division in the Wallowa AO, arrived in the Jeb Stuart AO and was placed OPCON to the 1st ACD.

12. On 26 January, 5/7 Cav was released OPCON Americal Division in the Wallowa AO and became OPCON 3d Bde in the Jeb Stuart AO. The 2d Bde, 101 Abn Division became OPCON to the 1st ACD. The 2d Bde 101 Abn Div initially consisted of 1st Bn 501 Abn and 2d Bn 501 Abn.

13. On 27 January the 1/502d Abn joined the 2d Bde 101 Abn Div in the Jeb Stuart AO. The 502d was later placed OPCON to the 1st Bde.

14. By 31 January the alignment of maneuver Bn's in the Brigades of the 1 ACD was as follows:

a. 1st Bde
1/12 Cav
1/8 Cav
1/5 Cav
1/502 Abn

b. 2d Bde
1/501 Abn
2/501 Abn

c. 3d Bde
2/12 Cav
1/7 Cav
5/7 Cav

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 7: Supply and Services

1. Class I Activities

- a. During the period 60,096 meals of Long Range Patrol Rations were issued to divisional units.
- b. Ice cream in the quantity of 8,520 gallons was shipped to LZ Uplift and LZ English.
- c. During the period 7,288 tons of rations were issued to divisional units.

2. Class II - IV Activities

- a. Division received 4,370 chrome-chambered M-16 rifles for direct exchange during the reporting period.
- b. Thirty-six M-102 (105mm) howitzers were received by the division for direct exchange.

3. Class III Activities

- a. A total of 580 fuel samples were analyzed during the period, of these 351 were on grade, 127 not the use limits, and 102 were off specification. No significant problems exist in fuel quality and sampling which will impair the operational capability of the division.
- b. During the period 20 lifelines were received, processed, and shipped to divisional units for a total of 60 tons.

4. Class V Activities

- a. Ammunition continued to be available in adequate quantities to meet the division needs, but due to eleven items on the ASR careful control had to be maintained.
- b. Class V personnel of the 15th Supply and Service Battalion assisted the EOD in the destruction of unserviceable ammunition.
- c. During the period 26 pre-USARV IG inspections and 31 courtesy inspections were conducted.

5. Food Service Activities

- a. During the period liaison visits and advisory visits were conducted at mess halls in the forward areas and base camp.
- b. Pre-USARV IG inspections were conducted on 16 mess halls within the division.

6. Aerial Supply Activities

Aerial equipment support personnel continued to provide rigger support at the forward supply point, to include inspection, recovery, and classification of slings and other aerial delivery items.

7. The following supplies were issued to division units:

- a. Class I: 7,595 tons
- b. Class II & IV: 8,743 tons
- c. Class III:
 - (1) AVGAS: 459,900 gal
 - (2) JP-4: 6,713,200 gal
 - (3) HOGAS: 2,423,625 gal
 - (4) DF-2: 2,931,475 gal
- d. Class V: 31,771 tons

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 8: Transportation and Maintenance

1. Transportation

a. Air transportation. Significant movement during the period 1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968 were as follows:

TYPE	DATE	UNIT	ORIN	DEST	TYPE //C	CARGO LBS	PAX	SORTIES
01	1-11	1st Cav	ANK	QNH	C130	0	135	2
01	1-11	1st Cav	QNH	ANK	C7A	0	135	6
CE	5-11	11th Avn Gp	ANK	CHU	C130	38,000	20	2
CE	6-11	2/5	ANK	ENG	C123	13,600	135	5
CE	6-11	1/12	ENG	ANK	C123	210,000	390	11
CE	11-11	1/12	ANK	DAK	C130	138,600	600	13
CE	11-11	229	ANK	KON	C130	19,800	12	2
CE	14-11	1st Bde	PHU	KON	C130	481,800	781	35
CE	14-11	15th TC	ANK	KON	C130	109,000	54	6
01	21-11	15th TC	ANK	MTT	C130	15,000	0	1
01	4-12	3d Bde	ANK	CHU	C130	7,500	1	1
01	6-12	15th S&S	ANK	CHU	C130	16,450	1	1
CI	9-12	2/12	ANK	CHU	C130	21,600	0	1
SPL	23-12	1/5	ANK	CRB	C130	-	202	2
SIL	23-12	1/5	CRB	ANK	C130	-	202	2
01	28-12	1/12	ENG	ANK	C130	79,180	527	9
01	28-12	1/5	ANK	ENG	C130	60,540	549	9
01	8-1	1st Cav	BSN	ANK	C7A	20,500	13	5
01	10-1	1st Cav	ANK	BSN	C7A	9,200	10	2

b. Airlift utilized to move division elements from the Pershing and Byrd AOs and from An Khe to the Jeb Stuart AO:

FROM	TOTAL SORTIES	PERIOD	AV DAILY SORTIES
Phu Cat	15	17 Jan	15
An Khe	256	17-29 Jan	19.7
English	201	17-24 Jan	25.1
Phan Thiet	46	19-22 Jan	15.3

c. SEA (USAF) airlift and C7A courier services.

(1) A daily courier service by C7A aircraft was maintained throughout the period to division forward areas. At close of period C7A flights were in operation between An Khe, Phu Bai and Quang Tri.

(2) A total of 11 daily passenger/cargo flights were scheduled to An Khe by the SEA airlift service. C-130 Medevac service was available on call.

d. Ground Transportation. The division was supported by the 541st Transportation Company (light trucks) until the move to the Jeb Stuart AO. The loss of this support has caused a critical shortage of transportation within the division.

2. Maintenance, Ground

a. Vehicle road side spot checks in both the base camp and forward areas were conducted prior to the move but have been suspended temporarily in the new AO.

b. Vehicle maintenance capability in the Jeb Stuart AO is limited because the 27th Maintenance Bn is separated from the division base and the forward units and the road has been closed by enemy action.

c. The division CHMI Team in conjunction with the Inspector General's Office conducted courtesy pre-AGI-CHMI inspections in preparation for the USARV AGI. These inspections were discontinued upon movement to the Jeb Stuart AO.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
 Inclosure 8: Transportation and Maintenance

3. Aircraft Maintenance

a. The following number of aircraft by type have been dropped from accountability during the reporting period:

<u>ACFT TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
OH-13S	16
UH-1B	16
UH-1C	18
UH-1D	35
UH-1H	20
CH-47	10
CH-54	1

b. The following number of aircraft by type have been received from stock or other commands during the reporting period:

<u>ACFT TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
OH-13S	6
UH-1B	14
OH-6A	15
UH-1C	6
UH-1H	34
CH-47	5
CH-54	2
OV-1	3
O-1	1
U-6A	1

c. End of reporting period statistics

<u>ACFT</u>	<u>Ave. HOURS (%)</u>	<u>Ave. NORM (%)</u>
OH-6A	2	16
OH-13	5	25
UH-1B	7	26
UH-1C	10	28
UH-1D	4	17
UH-1H	4	21
CH-47	1	45

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Inclosure 9: Facilities

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1. A proposed base development plan for Camp Radcliff was prepared listing camp real estate assets, requirements, and deficiencies. The plan was prepared on the assumption that Camp Radcliff unit strength would remain the same. With the relocation of major elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and consolidation of rear detachment elements in Camp Radcliff under the division A/C, the installation coordinating responsibility was transferred to the CO, An Khê Sub Area Command, Qui Nhon Support Command, 1st Logistics Command on 19 January 1968.

2. The Camp Radcliff base development planning board -- with the CO, An Khê Sub Area Command as installation coordinator presiding -- met on 26 January 1968 to consider the proposed base development plan in view of the displacement of major division elements. Requirements for combatant and administrative structures were reduced. Requirements for utilities remained the same.

3. Construction projects underway at Camp Radcliff during the relocation of division elements were continued. These included 2 hangers on the Golf Course, and a parachute maintenance shed (for the 173rd Abn Bde). At the An Khê Army Airfield, construction included extending the main taxiway east; relocating the airfield access road; enlarging and improving the parking apron.

4. Consolidation of 1st Air Cavalry Division rear detachments at Camp Radcliff was accomplished from 22 to 30 Jan 68 by physically relocating these sections into combined areas. For example, all rear elements of the 11th Avn Gp, including the group headquarters, the 227th, 228th, and 229th AHB's and the 11th G.S. Co moved into what had been the 228th AHB area.

5. A physical inventory was conducted on 28 January 1968 by the 1st Air Cavalry Division G-4 facilities officer and a representative of the 1st Marine Division (REINF), FMF to determine quantities of real estate assets located at Camp Evans. The following assets were occupied by the 1st Air Cavalry Division and were receipted for:

<u>ASSET</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
16'x64' Southeast Asia Type Hut	4
16'x32' SEA Hut	28
16'x16' SPA Hut	11
16'x64' Strongback Tent Frame	1
16'x32' Strongback Tent Frame (includes 211 tent frames w/tentage which were unserviceable)	253
3-Hole Latrine	30
120'x20' Bunker	1
30'x20' Bunker	1
24'x12' Bunker	1
500 Man Standard Type Mess Hall	1
16'x32' Maintenance Shed	1
16'x18' Generator Shed	1
16'x60' Chapel	1
50', 3 Leg Observation Tower	1
10', 4 Leg Tower for 3,000 Gal Water Tank	2

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 10: Civil Affairs

1. Population & Resources Control

a. Operation Dragnet continued with good results.

The 222nd NPTF Battalion remained with the Division in the Pershing AO conducting joint operations with the 545th Military Police Company, 1/9th Cav and the 1st and 2nd Brigade. Tabulated results for Nov-Dec appear below.

Enemy KIA - 29
Enemy POW - 43
Houses Searched - 8484
CD's - 170
IC's - 107,834
Weapons - 18
Documents - 35.5 in
Arms - 1306
Med Supplies - 2 lbs
Mines and Grenades - 84
Rice - 38,900
TNT - 6 one pound blocks

b. Rice Harvest Control: Harvest in the AO was completed about 15 Dec 67. Efforts were directed at coming up with a solution for rice storage in contested areas. On 27 Nov the Province Chief decreed that people in contested areas can keep 12 kilos of milled rice per person per month until the next harvest season. A joint letter by the Province Chief and CG 1st Air Cav Div was forwarded to IFFV recommending a program be worked out to compensate people in contested areas for rice taken from them. Planting for the spring harvest began in Hoai Nhon District.

c. There were virtually no refugees created during the period.

d. During the period 191,825 lbs of rice were captured of which 167,545 lbs were evacuated and distributed in GVN controlled areas, mainly to refugees in camps.

2. Revolutionary Development: 2nd Brigade continued providing a protective outer shell for the 12 MC Teams conducting pacification programs in Phu My District. Nine RD Teams were received by Phu My District in early January with an additional team to arrive after TET.

3. Civic Action:

a. 550 MEDCAPS were held treating 38,489 patients.

b. In early December 1967 the 1st ACD SJA was appointed a Foreign Claims Commission with authority to adjudicate all non-combat claims not in excess of \$1,000.00 value. This greatly expedited processing of minor claims and proved to be an effective means of restoring good will with the local peasantry after they suffered losses from non-combat incidents.

c. Two holidays were celebrated during the quarter: National Day on 1 Nov and Christmas. The 1st ACD sent a marching unit, the Div Band, and a civic action display to Qui Nhon to participate in the former and over 20 parties were held in local hamlets and refugee camps during the latter holiday.

d. Construction of four dispensaries commenced in Hoai Duc Village, Hoai Nhon District. All school projects initiated in the Pershing AO by the 1st ACD were completed.

e. The An Tue High School is now approximately 80% completed. A member of the G-5 staff remained in An Kho to supervise completion of this project.

f. All other incomplete projects in both the TAO and AO were turned over to the local MACV Advisory Teams or locally stationed US units.

g. Civil Affairs Team #14 reverted back to the 41st CA Company when the 1st ACD moved into I Corps. The 9th AA Plt (Provisional) from the 29th CA Company was attached to the 1st ACD upon arrival in I Corps.

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Inclosure 10: Civil Affairs

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1. There was no participation by units of the Div in TET celebrations because of the move to the new AO and intense VC/NVA activity, however, three thousand toys, fifteen hundred TET envelopes and one-hundred and fifty pounds of candy will be distributed in hamlets near Phong Dien Headquarters in early February. These TET activities will include participation by the District Chief or his representatives.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 11: Psychological Operations:

1. General

- a. 45,525,000 leaflets were dropped and 204 hours of taped aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were recorded. Eleven VC/NVA rallied to elements of the divisions, and most were exploited by making tapes, and producing special leaflets which included their photographs and hand written messages.
- b. One Armed Propaganda platoon of 27 Hoi Chanhs was received into the division during December, and the men dispersed to units of the 1st and 2nd Brigades and 1st Squadron 9th Cav.
- c. Christmas carols were broadcast over GVN controlled areas on Christmas day, using 1,000 watt heliborne loudspeakers.
- d. A significant event was the rallying of three NVA in the 506 Valley after the Second Brigade Psyops Field team made a heliborne loudspeaker appeal over a contact area, giving specific instructions on how to rally.

2. Programs and Themes:

- a. Programs
 - (1) Anti-VC tax
 - (2) Give Allied Forces information
 - (3) NVA hardships
 - (4) Use National Safe Conduct Pass
 - (5) General Chieu Hoi Appeal
 - (6) What "Open Arms" means to you, fighter of the front.
 - (7) Weapons/information reward
 - (8) Do not harbor VC
 - (9) NVA cadre do not trust VC soldiers
 - (11) Curfew on the waterways
- b. Posters and leaflets developed
 - (1) Leaflets of Hoi Chanhs messages
 - (2) Weapons captured in Battle of Tam Quan
 - (3) Highway Safety
 - (4) VC terrorism in Trung Thanh Hamlet
- c. Tapes Used:
 - (1) Don't harbor VC
 - (2) Curfew on the waterways
 - (3) Anti-tax and food collection
 - (4) Appeals by Hoi Chanhs to their units
 - (5) JUSMOC tapes
- d. Chieu Hoi Program:
 - (1) During this period, eleven VC/NVA rallied to the division.
 - (2) Hoi Chanhs were exploited for psyops by tape recorded message appealing to their comrades to rally to the GVN, and by leaflet messages with the same appeals.

3. Equipment and support:

- a. The 1st Cav Div received support from the 8th Psyops Bn in the form of leaflets, posters, and tapes.
- b. The 9th Air Commando Squadron continued air support with the O2B and C-47 aircraft broadcasting loudspeaker messages and leaflet drops.
- c. Heliborne 1,000 watt loudspeakers were employed by the Brigades for population control and broadcasting Chieu Hoi appeals in support of ground operations.
- d. A test of the effectiveness of US Air Force loudspeaker broadcasts using the O2B aircraft was conducted on 26 Dec 67. As a result of the test, the Air Force agreed to lower its present minimum altitude of 3,000 feet to a more effective level, the altitude to be determined after further tests have been conducted.

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